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ESSAY
THE SPLIT BENEFIT: THE PAINLESS WAY
TO PUT SKIN BACK IN THE
HEALTH CARE GAME
Christopher Robertsont
This Essay proposes a solution to the growth of health care costs, focus-
ing on the sector of expensive, and often unproven, treatments. Political,
legal, and market limits prevent insurers and physicians from rationing care
or putting downward pressure on prices. Because the insurer bears the cost,
the patient is also not sensitive to price, and thus consumes even low-value
but high-cost treatments.
The traditional cost-sharing solution is onerous for patients with lim-
ited wealth. When treatments can cost $25,000 or more, one cannot expect
the median patient to pay a significant portion thereof Instead, patients
often enjoy supplemental insurance or exhaust their cost-sharing limits, and
thus enjoy full insurance when making such a consumption decision. Rais-
ing the limits is a painful solution, since it would reduce access to care and
cause medical bankruptcies.
A new solution emerges from the recognition that insurance currently
provides only an "in-kind" benefit, paid to the provider rather than the bene-
ficiary. Instead, under a "split benefit, "for expensive treatments (costing,
say, $100, 000), the insurer should consider satisfying its coverage obligation
by paying a portion (say, $10,000) directly to the patient. The patient then
decides whether to spend that portion on the treatment. If so, the insurer
pays the balance ($90,000) to the provider, thereby insuring access. If the
patient instead declines the care, he or she can save or spend the money on
anything else. The insurer saves the balance ($90,000).
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Because it is fungible, the split benefit creates an opportunity cost, caus-
ing some patients to decline the expensive treatment in lieu of medical and
nonmedical alternatives that they value more highly. Strikingly, the split
benefit is consistent with current insurance contracts and regulations, since
it does not change coverage or the size of the benefit. That feature makes the
split benefit practicable, unlike many other theoretical solutions. Moreover,
the insurer can exercise the split benefit as a unilateral option whenever it is
most likely to save money.
The split benefit is a better solution than traditional cost sharing or
rationing by insurers or physicians, which all reduce access to care. The
proposal serves patients' autonomy by giving them additional options and
reduces the distortion in the larger economy caused by nonfungible insur-
ance. This Essay considers objections, including the possibility of stimulat-
ing false demand and the need to protect patients who are unable to decide
for themselves-both of which the appropriate legal mechanisms can address.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. health care spending has reached approximately $2.5 trillion
or 17.6% of GDP.' We spend more on health care than on food,
housing, transportation, or anything else.2 Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) leaders have argued that "our country's financial health
will in fact be determined primarily by the growth rate of per capita
1 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERvS., OFFICE OF THE AcrUARY, NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONs 2010-2020: FORECAsT SUMMARY 4 tbl., available at https://
www.cms.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/proj20lO.pdf.
2 See Timothy StoltzfusJost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 537, 537 (2006).
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health care costs."3 At the household level, health care spending
leads to personal bankruptcies and home foreclosures.4
The states are also suffering from the health care cost burden.
"Last year, Medicaid spending was estimated to account for nearly a
quarter of total state spending-the largest portion of their budgets-
and it's getting only more expensive."5 These costs have assumed con-
stitutional proportions, as the Supreme Court has recently taken up
the allegations that the federal government mandates have comman-
deered the state budgets.6
It will only get worse. As shown in Figure 1, experts expect na-
tional health spending to comprise 20% of GDP by 2020, with health
care costs inflation dramatically outpacing every other sector of the
economy.7 This would amount to nearly $13,500 for each American,
nearly three times the cost in 1999.8 The CBO projects that unless the
system implements significant changes, health spending will grow to
half of all U.S. spending.9 One former secretary of health and human
services called this the "health-care inflation monster" that is eating
our economy.' 0
3 Peter R. Orszag & Philip Ellis, The Challenge of Rising Health Care Costs-A View from
the Congressional Budget Office, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1793, 1793 (2007).
4 See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results
of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741, 744-45 (2009); Christopher Tarver Robertson
et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX
65, 90-94 (2008).
5 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, What We Give Up for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012, 5:41
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/what-we-give-up-for-health-
care/.
6 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
7 See CTRs. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 1, at 4 tbl.L
8 See id.; see also Edward J. Larson, Medical Rationing, Death Panels and the Rising Cost of
Health Care: Whittier Law School Health Law Symposium Paper, 33 WHITrIER L. REv. 13, 15
(2011) (reviewing this data).
9 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE GROWTH OF HEALTH
CARE SPENDING 5 (2008) [hereinafter CoNG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE],
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8947/01-31-TechHealth.pdf.
10 Robert Pear, Reagan Has Achieved Many Goals, but Some Stir Opposition, N.Y. TIMES,

















2007 2022 2037 2052 2067 2082
Source: Congressional Budget Office
Note: Amounts for Medicare are net of beneficiaries' premiums. Amounts for Medicaid are
federal spending only.
For both public and private health insurers, reform to address the
cost conundrum seems inevitable. The question is how. The default
rule will be the sorts of crude policies that also cut into access, choice,
and health. For example, states are slashing their Medicaid budgets
nationwide." Arizona stopped paying for certain organ transplants.' 2
Hawaii refuses to pay for hospital stays of more than ten days for most
patients, regardless of whether the hospital can safely discharge the
patient.'3 Other states are doing likewise.14 These solutions are far
from elegant. They are zero-sum games, which the patients lose.
A more elegant solution requires closer attention to the causes.
It is tempting to suppose that demographic changes drive this growth.
Yet, the United States spends 20 to 30 percent more per capita than
countries with excellent health care systems and similarly aging popu-
lations, such as France and Germany.15 As Ezekiel Emanuel writes,
"The truth is, the United States is not getting 20 or 30 percent better









health care or results than other countries."' 6 And, even within the
United States, from one region to another, there are large disparities
in the amount spent on health care, which demographic and health
factors cannot explain.17 Areas with double, or even triple, the
amount of spending per patient do not show better outcomes as a
result.18
"[M]ost analysts have concluded that the bulk of the long-term
rise resulted from the health care system's use of new medical services
that were made possible by technological advances. . . ."19 If this mar-
ket were efficient-and if such spending were making us healthier
and happier than alternative spending could-then we would count
this trend as progress.20 Closer analysis reveals, however, that this
market is failing to align our health care consumption choices with
our values, which is to say that much of this money is wasted. This
failure results from a complex set of well-intentioned laws that man-
date coverage of expensive, and often unproven, treatments but effec-
tively prevent anyone from weighing the costs of those treatments.
First, public or private insurance covers most of the patients who
make the majority of health care spending choices.2' The recent
health care reform legislation imposes a legal mandate on employers
to cover their workers and on individuals to enroll themselves, and
helps subsidize the costs of premiums.22 Thus, as we approach univer-
sal coverage, insurers will handle nearly all health care spending deci-
sions. Therefore, the question of how to control health care costs is
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 See id. But see Richard A. Cooper, States with More Health Care Spending Have Better-
Quality Health Care: Lessons about Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. w103, w112-13 (2009) (noting
that quality "depends on total health care spending" and "relates to a broad array of soci-
odemographic characteristics," and that "Medicare spending is a poor proxy for overall
health care spending.").
19 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra note 9, at 1; see also Mark A.
Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1637, 1664 (1992) ("According to most observers, a driving force behind the increase in
health care spending is new technology.").
20 See generally Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Aspirin, Angioplasty, and Proton
Beam Therapy: The Economics of Smarter Health Care Spending 1, 3 (Sept. 9, 2011) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2011/2011.
BaickerandChandra.paper.pdf (discussing estimates as to whether it is optimal to spend as
much as a third of the U.S. economy on health care, but arguing that the spending is likely
less than optimal).
21 See CRs. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH ExPENDITURES BY
TYPE OF SERVICE AND SOURCE OF FUNDS, CY1960-2011, available at http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpend
Data/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (showing that public and private insurers
pay over eighty-eight percent of health care costs).
22 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2006); see also Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 4-20 (D.C.




largely a question of how to design public and private insurance poli-
cies so that insurers cover patients for the treatments they demand but
also minimize wasteful spending.23
When deciding whether and how to cover the costs of health care
treatments-including drugs, devices, surgeries, imaging, tests, and
other procedures-a rational insurer will be primarily concerned
about whether they are cost-effective and efficient. Some treat-
ments-such as blood pressure and diabetes drugs-are known to be
efficient for health insurers. Spending more money on these proce-
dures actually saves the insurer money by preventing the need for ex-
pensive procedures later.2 4 A recent wave of research has endorsed
the idea of Value-Based Insurance Design (VBID), wherein insurers
reduce or eliminate co-pays and deductibles for such treatments, and
perhaps even create affirmative programs to encourage their adoption
and adherence.25
At the other end of the cost-effectiveness spectrum is a vast do-
main of expensive treatments that have small or unproven effective-
ness. The CBO has noted that "[a]lthough estimates vary, some
experts believe that less than half of all medical care is based on or
supported by adequate evidence about its effectiveness."2 6 When
Medicare Administrator Donald Berwick stepped down from his post
in 2011, he argued that 20 to 30 percent of health care spending-
more than $1 trillion a year-was waste.2 7 "Much is done that does
not help patients at all," Dr. Berwick said, "and many physicians know
it.""92
One might suppose that if the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) approves a drugs or device, then it is proven effective.
23 See generally Robert H. Blank, Regulatory Rationing: A Solution to Health Care Resource
Allocation, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1573 (1992) (discussing a more fundamental approach to this
question). Robert Blank's paper takes for granted the primary features of the American
health care system circa 2012.
24 See generally Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their
Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 378, 381 (1995) (compiling studies of cost-
effectiveness).
25 See Michael E. Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, 26 HEALTH AFF. w195,
w195, w197 (2007).
26 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL
TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE 11 (2007) [hereinafter
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREAT-
MENTS], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/MainText.3.1.shtml (cit-
ing LEIGHANNE OLSEN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L AcAos., LEARNING WHAT WORKS
BEST: THE NATION'S NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH CARE
app. A, at 341 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64787/pdf/
TOC.pdf).
27 Editorial, Candid Advice from a Health Care Visionary, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at
A34; Robert Pear, Health Official Takes Parting Shot at Waste,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at
A23.
28 Pear, supra note 27, at A23.
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However, the FDA's statutory authority requires only that manufactur-
ers prove minimal effectiveness compared to a placebo, which is to say
that the product is better than nothing.29 Physicians often still must
guess about whether the new drug or device will prove more effective
than standard treatments.30 Even when a drug has FDA approval and
proven effectiveness, this does not necessarily mean that the drug is
cost-effective. Indeed, the FDA statute does not authorize it to con-
sider costs-only medical risks and benefits. 31 Even more, the FDA
statute also allows physicians to prescribe drugs and devices off-label
for other unapproved diseases and conditions without any proof or
FDA review of efficacy.32 The law actually prevents the FDA from tak-
ing an active role in controlling costs in the American health care
system.
Thus, there are many expensive drugs, devices, and other treat-
ments that are arguably not worth their cost. Consider, for example,
the $80,000 treatment for breast cancer called high-dose chemother-
apy plus autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC-ABMT). 33 The
HDC-ABMT treatment became very popular in the 1990s, even
though clinical trials had not proven the treatment effective.34 At
first, insurers refused to pay.35 "Their refusals led to an avalanche of
29 SeeJerry Avorn, FDA Standans-Good Enough for Government Work, 353 NEw ENG.J.
MED. 969, 969 (2005). See generally Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008)
(analyzing the preemptive effect of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) statute
for medical devices); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (discussing the
purpose and function of the FDA approval process and upholding a ban on the sale of
unapproved drugs).
30 See generally Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Com-
ment Request; Experimental Study of Comparative Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 76
Fed. Reg. 38663, 38664 (July 1, 2011) (noting that "few head-to-head clinical trials have
been conducted"); Sanket S. Dhruva et al., Strength of Study Evidence Examined by thePDA in
Premarket Approval of Cardiovascular Devices, 302 JAMA 2679, 2679 (concluding that
"[ pl remarket approval of cardiovascular devices by the FDA is often based on studies that
lack adequate strength and may be prone to bias").
31 See Peter J. Neumann et al., The FDA and Regulation of Cost-Effectiveness Claims, 15
HEALTH AFF. 54, 55 (1996). Still, the insurers' actuaries may have developed such data
internally, and recent public policy initiatives should expand our knowledge in this area.
See Recovery Act Allocates $1.1 Billion for Comparative Effectiveness Research, U.S. DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & Hum. SERVICEs, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/os/cerbios.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2013).
32 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) ("Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health
care practitioner-patient relationship."); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S.
341, 350-51 (2001) (discussing off-label use in the context of medical devices).
33 See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy over High-Dose Chemo-
therapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 101, 101-02
(2011).
34 See id. at 103-05 (describing 1990s clinical trials' inability prove the efficacy of the
treatment).
35 Id. at 103.
2013] 927
928 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:921
litigation, accompanied by intensive political lobbying by patient advo-
cacy groups."36 For example, the Minnesota legislature mandated
that insurers cover it.?
"These legal and political pressures led most health plans to ca-
pitulate and pay for the treatment by the mid-1990s."3 8 More than
41,000 patients consumed HDC-ABMT during the 1990s at an aggre-
gate cost of about $3.28 billion.39 By 2000, new research showed that
the "insurers were correct" in their initial refusals to pay.40 But, of
course, the money could not be unspent. Nor can those patients re-
verse the serious risks and side effects that accompanied this ineffec-
tive treatment.41 For hundreds of other expensive and novel
treatments, we now find ourselves in the same situation of epistemic
uncertainty where insurers must pay for unproven treatments. 42
Likewise, consider Avastin, which, at $88,000 per treatment, is
eleventh on a list of the fifteen most expensive drugs.43 Genentech
marketed Avastin for the treatment of breast cancer after the FDA
granted accelerated approval for that use in 2008.44 The FDA based
its approval on two open-label studies that showed that the drug
slowed the rate of tumor growth but showed "no evidence of an effect
on overall survival or improved symptoms."45 Still, oncologists readily
prescribed Avastin to their desperate patients.46
Subsequent double-blinded studies failed to replicate the early
findings.47 In 2011, after an extensive process, the FDA commissioner
exercised her statutory authority to revoke Avastin as a treatment for
36 Id. at 102.
7 See Karen G. Gervais & Reinhard Priester, Mandates for Unproven Health Care Interven-
tions, 79 MINN. MED. 52, 52 (1996).
38 Mello & Brennan, supra note 33, at 102.
39 See id. at 101-02. The aggregate cost is computed by multiplying the individual
price by the number of patients, both of which Mello and Brennan provide in their article.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 110 ("Acute-onset toxicities (in addition to vomiting and diarrhea) in-
clude sepsis, pulmonary failure, veno-occlusive disease, cardiac failure, nephrotoxicity,
hemorrhagic cystitis, and cardiac toxicity.").
42 See text accompanying notes 103-19 (discussing reasons why insurers feel so com-
pelled to pay).
43 Merrill Goozner, An Extra Month of Life: Is It Really Worth the Cost?, FiSCAL TIMES
(June 30, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/06/30/An-Extra-Month-of-
Life-Is-it-Really-Worth-the-Cost.aspx#pagel.
44 See Proposal to Withdraw Approval for the Breast Cancer Indication for AVASTIN
(Bevacizumab), Docket No. FDA-2010-N-0621, at 23 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Food & Drug Admin. Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Decision of the Commissioner] (decision
of the commissioner). But cf Goozner, supra note 43 (describing how the FDA revoked
approval in 2010 for the Genentech drug Avastin for the treatment of breast cancer).
45 Decision of the Commissioner, supra note 44, at 13. The studies submitted to ob-
tain accelerated approval (the E2100 study and the AVF211 9g study) considered tumor
growth to constitute disease progression (PFS). Id. at 18.
46 See Goozner, supra note 43.
47 See Decision of the Commissioner, supra note 44, at 23-25.
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breast cancer, noting that its side effects presented very real dangers
to patients (including a risk of death) not balanced by a proven, real
benefit.48 Cancer patients protested the decision, calling it "nothing
short of a death sentence" for those who rely upon the drug.4 9
The decision will likely be taken up in court, but, for now, FDA
revocation prevents the drug manufacturer from marketing Avastin
for the treatment of breast cancer. However, despite the FDA's revo-
cation and because Avastin has at least one other FDA-approved indi-
cation on its label, oncologists can still freely prescribe Avastin for the
treatment of breast cancer.50 In turn, Medicare will continue to pay
for such treatments. 5' Some private insurers will likely follow suit.5 2
Treatments may be cost-effective for certain patients in certain
situations even while ineffective for others.53 For example, clinical
studies prove heart stents effective for use after a heart attack, and
surgeons implant more than one million each year, costing up to
$100,000 each.54 But stents are often used prophylactically in a do-
main that is not FDA-approved.55 A large randomized, controlled trial
(the gold standard for medical research) demonstrated that patients
who received stents prophylactically would have fared just as well on a
much cheaper (and safer) regimen of drugs.5 6
Likewise, the United States is now rapidly dispensing artificial
hips and knees to its aging population. In the United States, nearly
48 Id. at 12, 40.
49 Andrew Pollack, ED.A. Revokes Approval of Avastin for Use as Breast Cancer Drug, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at B7.
50 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006).
51 Medicare to Keep Paying for Controversial Cancer Drug Avastin, NATIONALJOURNAL (June
30, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/medicare-to-keep-
paying-for-controversial-cancer-drug-avastin-20110630.
52 See Meredith Melnick, Medicare Will Continue to Pay for Avastin, TIME (July 1, 2011),
http://healthland.time.com/2011/07/01/medicare-will-continue-to-pay-for-avastin/
#ixzzlZY3VWGdc (noting that "[im]any private health insurance companies typically follow
Medicare's lead"); see also Goozner, supra note 43 (quoting Lee Newcomer, Senior Vice
President for Oncology at UnitedHealthcare, who stated that "regardless of what the FDA
does, we wouldn't make any changes").
53 See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Op-Ed., Cut Medicare, Help
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A25 (describing inefficiencies in health care spend-
ing and the prophylactic use of stents in particular).
54 See id. While the cost of a stent can vary between $1,000 and $4,000, the average
cost of a stent procedure can vary from $30,000 to $100,000. See David Rosenfeld, Is Ameri-
can Medicine Too Stent Happy?, PAc. STANDARD (Apr. 17, 2010), http://psmag.com/health/
is-american-medicine-too-stent-happy-1 2861.
55 See Rosenfeld, supra note 54 ("An estimated 700,000 Americans will have a stent
implanted [in 2012] . . . either after a heart attack or stroke, to prevent one from happen-
ing. . . ."); Htut K. Win et al., Clinical Outcomes and Stent Thrombosis Following Off-Label Use of
Drug-Eluting Stents, 297 JAMA 2001, 2008 (2007) (finding that of the 3,323 patients en-
rolled in the study who had received stents, 54.7% had at least one off-label characteristic).
56 See William E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy With or Without PCI for Stable
Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503, 1503 (2007).
2013] 929
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one in twenty persons over the age of fifty now have artificial knees, at
a cost of about $40,000 each.57 The device industry continues to roll
out new models with higher and higher price tags that enthusiastic
surgeons suggest and install.5 8 Yet these newer devices often do not
perform any better than older, less expensive designs.59
"The list of procedures Medicare pays for that are proven to have
no benefit goes on and on."6 0 Whether provided by public insurers or
private health plans, this coverage likely exists because Americans de-
mand access to such treatments.61 And these big-ticket treatments,
concentrated in a small portion of the population, consume a huge
portion of our health care budgets. In 2009, as much as 22% of
health care costs fell upon only 1 percent of the population, where
each individual incurred more than $90,000 in costs.6 2
There can be little doubt that there is room for reform in this
sector of expensive treatments that have little or no proven effective-
ness. In this, the most heavily regulated industry in America, we have
not yet found a way to provide access to high-end, cutting-edge treat-
ments while being sensible about whether and when to actually con-
sume them. Strikingly, the recent landmark health care reforms
barely scratch the surface in this domain of cost control-the legal
and political challenges make this issue just too difficult to resolve.6 3
This Essay explains how we are left with a legal and policy regime that
57 Lindsey Tanner, Nearly 1 in 20 U.S. Adults over 50 Have Fake Knees, WASH. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/10/nearly-1-20-us-
adults-over-50-have-fake-knees/?page=all.
58 See Rajan Anand et al., What Is the Benefit of Introducing New Hip and Knee Prostheses?,
93J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 51, 53 (2011) (arguing that newer prostheses are likely more
expensive than older models); James G. Wright et al., Physician Enthusiasm as an Explanation
for Area Variation in the Utilization of Knee Replacement Surgery, 37 MED. CARE 946, 953 (1999)
(suggesting that "surgeons' opinions or enthusiasm for the procedure" is a dominant fac-
tor contributing to higher rates of knee replacement).
59 Anand et al., supra note 58, at 53; see also V. Wylde et al., Total Knee Replacement: Is It
Really an Effective Procedure for All?, 14 KNEE 417, 421 (2007) ("From the literature, it is
evident that there exists a substantial subsection of the TKR [total knee replacement] pop-
ulation who experience little or no benefit from the operation.").
60 Emanuel & Liebman, supra note 53.
61 See John A. Romley et al., Survey Results Show that Adults Are Willing to Pay Higher
Insurance Premiums for Generous Coverage of Specialty Drugs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 683, 683 (2012)
("US adults were estimated to be willing to pay an extra $12.94 on average in insurance
premiums per month for generous specialty-drug coverage-in effect, $2.58 for every dol-
lar in out-of-pocket costs that they would expect to pay with a less generous insurance
plan.").
62 See Steven B. Cohen & William Yu, The Concentration and Persistence in the Level of
Health Expenditures over Time: Estimates for the U.S. Population, 2008-2009, MED. EXPENDITURE
PANEL SURV. (Jan. 2012), http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/datafiles/publications/st354/
stat354.pdf.
63 See David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 67, 67-68 (2010) (arguing that, due to political pressures, "the
Act does far more about increasing access than it does about cutting costs").
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forces patients to pay in advance for coverage of treatments they think
they may someday want, creating a sunk cost. But it turns out that, at
the point of consumption, many patients would rationally prefer to
spend their money otherwise but are not allowed to do so. We have
created a systematic economic bias toward health care consumption.
This need not be the case.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I explains why and how the
current legal regime fails to prevent the overconsumption of expen-
sive yet often unproven treatments. There are various efforts to get
physicians, insurers, and patients themselves all to ration care, but
they fail to solve the problem. These mechanisms constrict access,
create conflicts of interest, and impose onerous burdens on patients.
Part II elucidates the essential problem that health insurance is
paid to health care providers rather than the beneficiaries. This Part
lays out the alternative approach of a "split benefit," in which part is
paid directly to patients and thereby creates an opportunity cost for
the consumption of expensive treatments. A particularly attractive as-
pect of this proposal is that the health insurers can implement it right
now under current contracts and laws, without need for an expansion
of the health care regulatory bureaucracy. The split benefit is thus a
unilateral option the insurer can exercise in situations where it is most
likely to work.
Part III explores some of the practical and normative objections,
including co-optation by providers, autonomy, welfare, and the
specialness of health. The split benefit empowers individuals to de-
cide for themselves how to best serve their own welfare.
This Essay concludes that the split benefit is a promising mecha-
nism for reducing the financial burden of expensive and often ineffec-
tual treatments, without reducing patient access to the care that they
prefer. Ultimately, the split benefit can reform a fundamental distor-
tion in our economy, allowing our spending decisions to more effi-
ciently reflect our values.
I
THE LIMITS or CURRENT RATIONING MECHANISMS
There are three parties in any health care consumption decision:
the physician, the payor, and the patient-and each of these could in
principle veto the consumption of low-value treatments. This Part ex-
plains why current efforts to reduce the consumption of these treat-
ments-whether relying on the discretion of physicians, insurers, or
patients-fail to resolve the problem. One can understand all of
these efforts as forms of "rationing," as they distribute scarce health
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care funds.64 The law, market, politics, and professional ethics all re-
strict the efficacy of these mechanisms for rationing and point toward
a better way.
A. The Physician Rationer
Federal and state laws put the physician in the role of gatekeeper
between patients and treatments. 65 The physician has the power to
ration care. If the physician declines to write a prescription, the pa-
tient cannot consume the drug. With both veto power and clinical
expertise, we might view the physician as an ideal rationer. This sec-
tion explains why physicians have their own reasons for prescribing
inefficient treatments and thus make poor rationers.
Bioethicists have criticized the suggestion that physicians should
take on the insurer's perspective because it could drive a wedge be-
tween the physician and his or her patient-client.66 Accordingly, fed-
eral law prohibits health care plans covering Medicare or Medicaid
patients from making "specific" payments "directly or indirectly" to
physicians "as an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary
services."67
There are contexts-such as managed care organizations
(MCOs)-in which insurers have created incentives for physicians to
ration care.68 During the 1980s and 1990s, managed care became rel-
atively popular. Soon thereafter, however, consumers became dissatis-
fied with limitations on their choices and challenged MCOs in a wave
of class action litigation.69 For various reasons, there was a widespread
retreat from efforts to incentivize physicians to ration care.70 More
recently, there has been another move toward "pay-for-perform-
64 See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAw, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 3-6 (1997).
65 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. 107-377, ch. 675, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006)) (defining prescription
drugs and requiring a doctor's prescription for such drugs).
66 See William M. Sage, Should the Patient Conquer?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1505, 1509
(2010). But see Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 156 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 73, 86 (6th ed. Supp. 2012) (holding for the first time that "physicians' consid-
ered judgments should reflect the best available evidence in the biomedical literature,
including data on . . . cost-effectiveness").
67 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (i) (8) (A) (i) (2006). See generally David Orendicher, Paying
Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 162
(1996) (discussing these provisions).
68 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220-21 (2000) (holding that rationing is an
essential function of health maintenance organizations).
69 See Ronald Lagoe et al., Current and Future Developments in Managed Care in the United
States and Implications for Europe, HEALTH RES. Pot'v & Sys. (Mar. 17, 2005), http://
www.health-policy-systems.com/content/3/1/4 ("[C]onsumer dissatisfaction with the busi-
ness practices of plans, including apparent arbitrary denials of service and failure to pay




ance"71 and "accountable care organizations" (ACOs),72 which help to
align the interests of payors and physicians. It remains an open ques-
tion as to whether these reforms will solve the problem, especially
when patients demand access to expensive, unproven treatments. 73
For the foreseeable future, many physicians will remain in fee-for-
service relationships.7 4 As the president of the American Board of In-
ternal Medicine has said,
One of the clearest reasons (for wasteful care] is our fee-for-service
payment system, where doctors get paid more for doing more. Very
few doctors do things that they know are wasteful, but if there's a
gray zone they could say, why not, it may help and it doesn't hurt
the patient.75
There are several other reasons why physicians may be biased to-
ward costly treatment. Sheer optimism may give physicians an irra-
tional belief in the effectiveness of unproven treatments.76
Alternatively, physicians may work under professional norms and per-
sonal ascriptions that encourage "heroic" treatments for desperate pa-
tients.77 Money and relationships with the drug and device industries
may also bias physicians.78
Physicians sometimes set themselves up in self-referral situations
where they refer patients to their own offices for expensive treat-
ments.7 9 Commonly, for example, a cardiologist may suggest a stent
71 See Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Effect of Finan-
cial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L.,
MED. & ETHics 452, 458 (2012).
72 Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, NPR (Jan. 18, 2011, 8:21 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/04/01/132937232/accountable-care-organizations-explained.
73 See Lee N. Newcomer, Changing Physician Incentives for Cancer Care to Reward Better
Patient Outcomes Instead of Use of More Costly Drugs, 31 HEALTH AeF. 780, 781 (2012) (arguing
for reform of "buy and bill" practices and reviewing current reform efforts). But see Baicker
& Chandra, supra note 20, at 22 (arguing that ACOs may fail to reduce the consumption of
high cost treatments, "particularly if the latest shiny innovation increases market share").
74 See Mark G. Field, The Doctor-Patient Relationship in the Perspective of "Fee-for-Service"
and "Third-Party" Medicine, 2J. HEALTH & Hum. BEHAv. 252, 254 (1961).
75 Sarah Kliff, In Health Care, Determining What's Unnecessary, WASH. PosT WONKBLOG
(Jan. 19, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/in-
health-care-determining-whats-unnecessary/2012/01/19/gIQAGo2mAQ.blog.html.
76 See generally Christine jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,
51 VAND. L. REv. 1653 passim (1998) (reviewing literature on "optimism bias").
77 Maureen Kwiecinski, To Be or Not to Be, Should Doctors Decide? Ethical and Legal Aspects
ofMedical Futility Policies, 7 MARo. ELDER'S ADVISOR 313, 319, 320-21 & n.21 (2006) (finding
that "differences in treatment recommendations may also be associated with a number of
non-clinical factors").
78 I have reviewed this literature with coauthors. See Robertson, Rose & Kesselheim,
supra note 71, at 462.
7 Federal law prohibits certain self-referral and kickback relationships. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952 (2011) (listing safe harbors). See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, Tainted Prose-
cution of Tainted Claims: The Law, Economics, and Ethics of Fighting Medical Fraud Under the
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and then offer to perform the implantation procedure.80 One study
that examined physicians who bought ownership stakes in specialty
hospitals to which they could then refer patients found that the "intro-
duction of financial incentives linked to ownership coincided with a
significant change in the practice patterns of physician owners."81
The authors observed a sixty-times increase in complex spinal fusion
surgeries by the physicians that bought in.82 In other fields, such as
oncology, scholars have documented physicians following the
money.83 Since 1989, there have been three rounds of lawmaking to
revise and tighten the Stark Law that regulates physician referral rela-
tionships,84 but the target keeps moving.
Further, physicians rely upon industry-created scientific re-
search.85 Judge Jack Weinstein writes, "[t]he pervasive commercial
bias found in today's research laboratories means studies are often
lacking in essential objectivity, with the potential for misinformation,
skewed results, or cover-ups."8 6 Similarly, an Institute of Medicine re-
port concluded that "[s]everal systematic reviews and other studies
provide substantial evidence that clinical trials with industry ties are
more likely to have results that favor industry."87 Nonetheless, some
physicians believe the science and are skewed in their prescribing de-
cisions. Many other physicians appear to discount such science and
must rely upon their own anecdotal experiences, which may be
skewed in other ways.88
Civil False Claims Act, 76 IND. L.J. 525, 554 (2001) (discussing the differences between the
self-referral law and the antikickback statute).
80 See David C. Levin et al., The Changing Roles of Radiologists, Cardiologists, and Vascular
Surgeons in Percutaneous Peripheral Arterial Interventions During a Recent Five-Year Interval, 2 J.
AM. C. RADIOLOGY 39, 41 (2005).
81 Jean M. Mitchell, Do Financial Incentives Linked to Ownership of Specialty Hospitals Affect
Physicians' Practice Patterns?, 46 MED. CARE 732, 736 (2008).
82 Id. at 735.
83 See generally Mireille Jacobson et al., How Medicare's Payment Cuts for Cancer Chemother-
apy Drugs Changed Patterns of Treatment, 29 HEALTH Ae. 1391, 1391 (2010) (assessing how
"substantially reduced payment rates for chemotherapy drugs ... affected the likelihood
and setting of chemotherapy treatment for Medicare beneficiaries").
84 See sources cited supra note 79.
85 See generally Christopher T. Robertson, The Money Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in
Biomedical Science, Without Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 358, 362 (2011)
(reviewing this literature).
86 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd sub nom.
UFCW Local 1776 v, Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing on the
question of causation).
87 INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRAC-
TICE 104 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009).
88 See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., A Randomized Study of How Physicians Interpret Research
Funding Disclosures, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1119, 1124 (2012) (showing that physicians tend
to discount the reliability of such research, even though industry funds most of the re-
search testing the efficacy of drugs and devices).
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Most physicians also accept money and industry perks. 9 Drug
and device manufacturers actively promote their products through
"detailing" visits to physicians' offices, providing physicians with a one-
sided view of the scientific literature about safety and efficacy.Y0 Many
attribute changes in physicians' prescribing decisions to these
relationships.91
Overall, the wide variation in health expenditures per patient
suggests that some physicians are much more attentive to evidence-
based medicine and cost.9 2 The foregoing considerations simply show
why physicians are not the complete solution to the problem ad-
dressed by this Essay: the consumption of expensive treatments with
little or no proven efficacy.
B. The Insurer Rationer
Insurers could simply refuse to pay for high-cost, low-value treat-
ments by saying that they are not "medically necessary"-the criterion
under most insurance contracts. 3 One might suppose that insurers
are the ideal rationers to make this assessment about the cost-benefit
profile of a treatment given that they have the aggregate perspective
of millions of insureds.
Abroad, it is more common for insurers to simply refuse to cover
a treatment. For example, Britain's National Health System (NHS) is
moving to cut Avastin's coverage for breast cancer, along with many
other drugs, such as Erbitux, which costs $128,000 per treatment.9 4
Given that the United Kingdom spends less than half as much of its
GDP on health care but reports significantly higher life expectancy
and health care quality, it may be tempting to adopt such an overt
rationing policy in the United States.95
89 See Eric G. Campbell et at, Physician Professionalism and Changes in Physician-Industry
Relationships from 2004 to 2009, 170 ARcmIVES INTERNAL MED. 1820, 1820 (2010) (finding
that of surveyed physicians, 63.8% received drug samples, 70.6% food and beverages,
18.3% reimbursements, and 14.1% payments for professional services).
90 See generally Robertson, Rose & Kesselheim, supra note 71, at 39 (reviewing the liter-
ature on the biasing impact of these detailing visits).
91 Id.
92 See sources cited supra notes 15-18
93 See generally Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1640-41 (discussing the varied use
of the phrase "medical necessity" to extend or refuse insurance coverage for certain treat-
ments); William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the
Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DuKE L.J. 597, 601 (2003) (same).
94 See Neil Lancefield, Breast Cancer Drug Avastin 'Not Effective' Says Nice, INDEPENDENT
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-
news/breast-cancerdrug-avastin-not-effective-says-nice- 7657 187.html; Roxanne Nelson, Ac-
cess to Expensive Cancer Drugs Limited in Both the US and UK, MEDSCAPE (Jan. 14, 2010), http:/
/www.medscape.com/viewarticle/7151 10.
95 See Larson, supra note 8, at 22; UK Comes Tap on End ofLife Care-Report, BBC NEWS
(July 14, 2010, 7:11 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-10634371 (describing a re-
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In America, public and private insurers do utilize this strategy of
refusing to pay. Medicare generally excludes drugs that are not at all
FDA-approved and excludes alternative treatments such as acupunc-
ture.96 And some insurers have indicated that they will not pay for
Avastin for breast cancer.97 Insurers also impose pre-utilization re-
views and "fail first" policies that require patients to try inexpensive
treatments before seeking reimbursement for more expensive
treatments.98
Still, the insurer's ability to ration is, and should be, severely lim-
ited. There are three reasons. Insurers are at an epistemic disadvan-
tage. Their rationing depends on questionable normative
assumptions. And, they have conflicts of interest that may bias their
assessments. Consider each problem in turn.
First, in cases where a physician recommends an expensive treat-
ment, there may be a reasonable dispute between the physician and
the insurer. The physician, unlike the insurer, has hands-on knowl-
edge of the particular patient.
Second, economists have developed metrics for measuring health
improvements, such as an increase in quality-adjusted life-years
(QALYs), to which they then assign dollar values.99 If the dollar value
of the benefit is greater than the dollar value of the costs, then the
treatment is arguably worthwhile. These efforts are notoriously con-
troversial, in part because "objective criteria for determining the value
patients receive from treatment are lacking."100 As one commentator
explains,
QALYs also have their fierce opponents who argue that they are
unjust and offensive, even if inevitable. They reject outright the
idea of ranking treatments for medical rationing and they object to
port by the Economist Intelligence Unit that ranked the United Kingdom's system ahead
of the United States' system).
96 See Your Medicare Coverage, MEDICARE, http://www.medicare.gov/Coverage/
Home.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
97 See, e.g., Deborah Kotz, Will Mass. Breast Cancer Patients Lose Coverage for Avastin,
Bos. GLOBE (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.boston.com/Boston/dailydose/2011/10/will-mass-
breast-cancer-patients-lose-coverage-for-avastin/mufDuqsDUqYuteyli5yRAM/index.html.
98 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1654 (describing precertification processes);
Stephen B. Soumerai, Benefits and Risks of Increasing Restrictions on Access to Costly Drugs in
Medicaid, 23 HEALTH AFF. 135, 136 (2004) (describing "fail first" policies that require pa-
tients to try a cheaper drug before escalating to the more expensive one).
99 See Measuring Effectiveness and Cost Effectiveness: The QALY, NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH
& CLINICAL EXCELLENCE, http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/features/measuring
effectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqalyjsp (last updated Apr. 20, 2010).
100 Seth A. Seabury et al., Patients Value Metastatic Cancer Therapy More Highly than Is
Typically Shown Through Traditional Estimates, 31 HEALTH Ave. 691, 691 (2012).
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the QALY method, which relies on healthy people to determine the
quality of life of those who are disabled or ill.101
Third, the insurer "stands to profit from not paying claims," a
conflict of interest with the patient's health.10 2 Still, insurers seek to
maintain a reputation for paying claims. 03 "[I]nsurers are acutely
aware that a well-publicized dispute over an inappropriately denied
claim might cause them to lose the next renewal of their contract."1 0 4
Public insurers face similar constraints because "we regard health in-
surance as a life raft for those in peril instead of a common-pool re-
source requiring stewardship. We reach desperately for any new
technology that might help defeat death. Any preplanned limit seems
like a death panel."105 Commentators have long concluded that it is
"highly unlikely that the American population would support the ra-
tioning of expensive high technology in the fashion characterizing En-
gland's National Health Service."106
Recognizing these problems, the law limits insurer rationing. In-
surers face the threat of litigation when they deny coverage, and
courts interpret insurer contracts in favor of the patient where ambig-
uous. 10 7 Traditionally, courts deferred to physician, rather than in-
surer, assessment of medical necessity.108 "Courts continually fail to
see beyond the heart-rending facts of the immediate case to the reality
that the present strained ruling in favor of coverage will be applied by
101 Gina Kolata, Ethicists Struggle to judge the 'Value' of Lye, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at
CS.
102 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1668. Mark Hall and Gerard Anderson ex-
plain, however, that the interests of insurer and insured may align where the insurer
merely manages benefits for a self-insured employer. See id. See generally JAY M. FEINMAN,
DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIEs DON'T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN
Do ABoUT IT (2010) (discussing insurers' tactics of delaying or denyingjustified claims and
forcing policyholders to litigate).
10 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1672.
104 Id.
105 Sage, supra note 66, at 1510; see also Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare and Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1519 (2005) (discussing similar reasons
for American distrust of a cost-effectiveness analysis for Medicare).
106 DAVID MEcHANIc, FROM ADvocAcy To ALLocATION: THE EvoLVING AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 215 (1986).
107 See Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E.2d 638, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Mello
& Brennan, supra note 33, at 107-10 (discussing the litigation against insurers over HDC-
ABMT, including a $77 million punitive damages judgment).
108 See David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment
Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861, 861-62 (1991) ("For nearly a century, it has been the 'settled
rule' that it is impossible for anyone to exercise control over the medical acts of physi-
cians."); see also Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.J., Civ. A. No. 90-597, 1990 WL
312647, at *1, *3, *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (enjoining insurer from denying coverage for
HDC-AMBT, which it deemed "investigational or experimental," despite consensus that it
was necessary to save the patient's life); Van Vactor, 365 N.E.2d at 645-46 (affirming the
trial court's denial of defendant insurer's motion for summary judgment based on affida-
vits of doctors and patients stating that the procedure was medically necessary).
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other courts even if the contract is revised in the suggested man-
ner."09 When patients challenge insurers' cost-effectiveness coverage
decisions, the insurers "consistently lose in court." 10
State and federal governments have imposed over two thousand
mandates on insurance providers, requiring them to cover particular
treatments."' Thirty-six of these mandates require coverage of off-
label drugs in particular, precisely those that often have unproven effi-
cacy." 2 Most states also allow patients who have been denied cover-
age based on medical necessity to appeal to an independent
physician." 3 Such "external review" policies remove ultimate power
from the hands of the insurer.114
For public insurers, the law further constrains their use of cost-
effectiveness analyses to refuse coverage. As a part of the landmark
health care reforms, Congress established an Independent Payment
Advisory Board (IPAB), which will eventually have broad powers to
reduce the cost of health care."" It was thought necessary to create
an independent agency for this purpose because political forces had
repeatedly prevented Congress from doing so itself. Peter Orszag has
called IPAB "the largest yielding of sovereignty from the Congress
since the creation of the Federal Reserve." 16 Still, even in this mo-
ment of possibility, Congress did not permit IPAB to make any policy
reforms that would alter the benefits of Medicare beneficiaries or re-
109 Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1657.
110 Id. at 1660.
1n See VicTORIA CRAIG BUNCE & J.P. WIESKE, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS.,
HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://
www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/MandatesintheStates20lOExecSummary.pdf
112 See id. at 5. For a discussion of FDA approval as a proxy for proven efficacy, see
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
113 See Aaron Seth Kesselheim, What's the Appeal? Trying to Control Managed Care Medical
Necessity Decisionmaking Through a System of External Appeals, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 877
(2001) ("[B]y 1999 thirty states and the District of Columbia had established rights to
external review for private health plan enrollees.").
114 See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 55, 93 (2002) ("External review essentially denies health plans any intermediary
role in selecting treatments .... [S]uch regulation drastically curtaills] opportunities for
health plans to . . . achieve consistency in administering ... benefits.").
115 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3403,
10320, 124 Stat. 119, 489-507, 949-952 (2010).





sult in "rationing."' 1 7 Even with these limitations, IPAB has become a
political lightning rod.118
This section has shown that the insurer's fiat is an incomplete
solution to the problem of expensive but low-value treatments. The
political, market, and legal limits are too great. Due to these pres-
sures, "insurers have largely abandoned direct attempts to limit cover-
age for most medical procedures and instead have adopted a pass-
through attitude toward medical spending."119
C. The Patient Rationer
In recent years, the idea of consumer-directed health care has
dominated health care reform debates. "Consumers must decide
whether a purchase is worth its price."120 The problem is that insur-
ance allows patients to be insensitive to price because patients do not
bear the cost. This problem is known as "moral hazard."
"Cost sharing"-in the form of co-pays, deductibles, coinsurance,
and caps on coverage-is the typical solution. As shown in Figure 2,
this method of cost control splits the cost between the insurer and the
patient, such that the insurance benefit becomes somewhat less than
the cost of the procedure. For example, the patient may be required
to pay a ten-dollar share of the costs to his health care provider, and
the insurer will pay the provider the remainder, say, $500.121
117 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3403(a) (1) (enacting a provision,
to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(c) (2) (A) (ii), stating that proposals by IPAB "shall not
include any recommendation to ration health care"); JACK EBELER ET AL., THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD: A NEW APPROACH TO
CONTROLLING MEDICARE SPENDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/
upload/8150.pdf.
S18 See, e.g., Jason Kane, Medicare Coverage of Pricey Cancer Drugs Sparks 'Rationing' Debate,
PBS (July 5, 2011, 3:27 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/07/pricey-
cancer-drugs-spark-rationing-debate.html (describing the controversy following Medicare
officials' decision to continue to pay for expensive cancer treatments of questionable
effectiveness).
119 Mark A. Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of Weight-Reduction Surgery,
53 DuKE L.J. 653, 655 (2003).
120 Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICi. L. REV. 643, 659 (2008).
121 See generally How to Spend Less on Copays and Coinsurancer, MEDICARE.COM, http://
www.medicare.com/medigap-insurance/how-to-spend-less-on-copays.html (last visited Feb.









Cost sharing reduces insurance outlays in two ways. First, it
reduces the burden on the insurer for each treatment consumed.
Second, and more importantly, the cost share may reduce consump-
tion by causing the patient to weigh that portion of the cost against
the potential benefits of the procedure. 122 A rational patient will view
the co-pay as an opportunity cost and consider whether she would pre-
fer to spend her money on something other than treatment. Thus, a
cost share partially aligns the interests of the insurer and the insured
by causing the patient to internalize some of the cost of the treatment.
The well-known 1970s RAND Health Insurance Experiment
demonstrated that cost sharing can decrease health care consump-
tion.12 3 In one condition, patients were required to make 95% co-
pays and in another, they received full insurance. The latter was asso-
ciated with a 45% increase in per capita spending.124 Further, how-
ever, the RAND study "also found that people consume less necessary
healthcare to the same extent as they consume less unnecessary
healthcare, and that poorer people with chronic diseases suffered
poorer health when faced with high cost sharing."125 These adverse
effects were noted even though the RAND study limited patients' ex-
posure to cost to $1,000 per year, 126 far short of the cost necessary to
122 See Chernew et al., supra note 25, at w196 ("The motivation behind the use of cost
sharing to allocate medical services and contain costs follows standard economic theory,
which presumes that consumers will use only those services whose benefit exceeds the cost
to them.").
123 SeeJOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GR., FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM
THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 338-39 (1993). The RAND study found that
cost sharing had no adverse impact on mortality for the average person, but did for ele-
vated-risk and low-income persons. See id. at 208-11.
124 Id. at 40.
125 Jost, supra note 2, at 584; see also M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care and
the Disadvantaged, 26 HEALTH Ave. 1315, 1318 (2007) (describing the RAND experiment's
finding "that high cost sharing reduced use of appropriate and inappropriate care in indis-
criminate fashion").
126 See NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., supra note 123, at 40.
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have a sizeable impact on the highly expensive procedures that are
the focus here.
Scholars have documented cost-sharing obligations imposing on-
erous burdens on patients. For example, insured patients who have
cost concerns delay seeking emergency care for heart attacks. 27 Can-
cer patients do not fill prescriptions or take full doses of the prescrip-
tions they did fill so as to preserve funds for cost-sharing obligations
on other treatments. 28 Children with chronic health conditions
forgo prescribed care.' 29
Scholars refer to this problem-where the insurance benefit is
too small in proportion to the cost of care-as "underinsurance." 30
If patients decline care because the co-pay is just too high given their
wealth, then the cost-sharing policy mechanism no longer achieves its
purpose of sorting high-value care from low-value care. 31 Instead,
the mechanism simply rations by wealth, which is to say that it discrim-
inates against the poor.
It is not merely that cost-sharing obligations are large and can
accumulate quickly. It is a pernicious cycle because illness and injury
are often correlated with a loss of income, which further exacerbates
the problem.' 32 It is difficult to earn money to pay cost-sharing obli-
gations when one is severely ill or when one must care for a sick child
or elderly parent. The cost-sharing tactic imposes financial burdens
on patients at a time when they may be least able to pay them.
Cost sharing also imposes negative externalities. Health care ex-
penses lead to millions of bankruptcies and foreclosures, which im-
pact other members of the family, other creditors, and
neighborhoods.13 3 Americans are already paying 15% to 22% of their
127 See Kim G. Smolderen et al., Health Care Insurance, Financial Concerns in Accessing
Care, and Delays to Hospital Presentation in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 303 JAMA 1392,
1397-99 (2010).
128 See Yousuf Zafar et al., Impact of Out-of-Pocket Expenses on Cancer Care, 29 J. CLINICAL
ONCoLoGY abstr. 6006 (Supp. 2011).
129 See Michael D. Kogan et al., Association Between Underinsurance and Access to Care
Among Children with Special Health Care Needs in the United States, 116 PEDIATRICS 1162,
1162-63 (2005).
130 See Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among US. Adults, 2003
and 2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. w298, w299 (2008) (classifying persons as "underinsured" if they
experience "at least one of three indicators of financial exposure relative to income").
131 SeeJoHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 144-51 (2003)
(arguing that the imposition of cost sharing may harm aggregate welfare because it
reduces access to both effective and ineffective care).
132 See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHwr: THE NEw ECONOMIC INSECU-
RITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 137-43 (rev. & exp. ed. 2008) (discussing
the economic insecurity that Americans face due to health care problems).
133 See sources cited supra note 4.
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family income on health care, making further cost shifting toward pa-
tients unfeasible.134
Recognizing that cost sharing is impractical when costs are high
in proportion to patient wealth, many public health insurance pro-
grams have minimal or no cost-sharing obligations. The beneficiaries
of these programs are already destitute since that is the precondition
for the public health insurance coverage. 35 More broadly, insurance
plans often cap co-pays and deductibles by annual limits, beyond
which the patient pays nothing out-of-pocket. "Roughly 77% of full-
time employees of medium and large establishments enrolled in non-
HMO plans have maximum out-of-pocket limits less than US$2000 per
individual and the most common coinsurance rate is 20%. Thus, indi-
viduals with more than US$10,000 in total costs will face no cost shar-
ing at the margin."136 As Timothy Jost explains, "Once consumers
reach the limits of the deductible, they have little reason to limit their
consumption of health care or to pay attention to its price." 37
Recent federal policy efforts have sought to increase these levels
to about $6,000 for an individual, in conjunction with incentives for
patients to save money in "health savings accounts." 38 Even assuming
that a patient does have enough money set aside to then reach these
higher limits, tests, office visits, and other treatments may quickly ex-
haust the higher limit, still long before a physician prescribes the pa-
tient an expensive treatment. And lawmakers in twenty states have
introduced bills to prevent insurers from imposing higher co-pay obli-
gations out of concern that big cost shares put expensive drugs out of
reach.139 Such high cost-sharing levels can undermine the purpose of
insurance: guaranteed access to desired care.140
134 See Patricia Ketsche et al., Lower-Income Families Pay a Higher Share of Income Toward
National Health Care Spending than Higher-Income Families Do, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1637, 1640
(2011).
135 See, e.g., Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from
the First Year 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17190.pdfnew-window=1 (explaining that Oregon's ex-
panded Medicaid program does not include a cost-sharing obligation).
136 Michael E. Chernew et al., Optimal Health Insurance: The Case of Observable, Severe
Illness, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 585, 588 (2000) (citation omitted).
137 Jost, supra note 2, at 587.
138 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION
969: HEALTH SAVINGs ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH PLANs 3 (2011), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf (noting the "high deductible" health plans
that are eligible for use in conjunction with health savings accounts, which are capped at
$5,950 per individual and $11,900 per family).
139 See Andrew Pollack, States Seek Curb on Patient Bills for Costly Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, April
13, 2012, at Al.
140 See Romley et al., supra note 61, at 683 ("Given the value that people assign to
generous coverage of specialty drugs, having high cost sharing on these drugs seemingly
runs contrary to what people value in their health insurance.").
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Moreover, many patients have purchased supplemental insurance
that covers the co-pay, thus preventing the patient from incurring any
of the cost at all. That is the purpose of the extremely popular "Medi-
Gap" policies used by Medicare enrollees. 141 "Catastrophic coverage"
policies have a similar function of eliminating the patient's exposure
to cost beyond a threshold.142
Thus, cost sharing is not a real solution where the cost of the
treatment is large. In a world where the median annual income is
$50,00014s and a treatment can cost twice that, cost sharing simply
cannot be our complete solution to the problem of high-cost but low-
value treatments.
A more radical and crude notion of cost sharing has emerged in
recent months-the Medicare voucher idea. Former Tennessee Gov-
ernor Phil Bredesen and Republican House Budget Chair Paul Ryan
have separately proposed to " [g) ive all Americans annual vouchers for
a certain dollar amount of health care and if they exceed [the value of
the voucher], they are on their own."' 4 4 This proposal is a radical
form of cost sharing because beyond the amount of the voucher, pa-
tients bear 100% of the cost for their care (if they can afford any
care).145 This proposal is crude because it severely hampers patients'
access to necessary care, regardless of whether the care is cost-effective




This Essay presents an alternative mechanism for achieving a
more rational expenditure of health insurance money in the set of
cases where the physician prescribes a high-cost treatment that the
insurer reasonably believes is inefficient. This mechanism seeks to
141 Of Medicare beneficiaries, 89 percent had some form of supplemental health in-
surance policies in 2006. JULIETrE CUBANSKI ET AL., THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
EXAMINING SOURCES OF COVERAGE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: SUPPLEMENTAL INSUR-
ANCE, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE, AND PRESCRITON DRUG COVERAGE 5 (2008), available at http:/
/www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7801.pdf.
142 See Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 602 ("Catastrophic plans provide full coverage
exactly when it should not exist (at the margin) and provide partial coverage precisely
when cost sharing provides no benefit (at expenditures below the cost of the least expen-
sive, medically appropriate treatment alternative).").
143 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 6 (2012), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
144 Larson, supra note 8, at 19-20.
145 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, For Medicare, We Must Cut Costs, Not Shift Them, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/for-




avoid the foregoing problems of co-pays and deductibles (which often
must be too small to work) and insurers' refusals to cover (which
tread on physician expertise, patient autonomy, and feasibility).
A. The Concept
Currently, insurers do not pay health insurance benefits to the
beneficiary. Instead, insurance is an in-kind benefit paid to the pro-
vider on behalf of the patient.
The benefit does create an option for patients to consume care
that might otherwise be unaffordable. That is the function and value
of insurance.14 6 But if a patient chooses to decline care for whatever
reason, the insurance benefit disappears. The nonfungible benefit
weighs only on one side of the rational patient's ledger, subsidizing
the consumption of more, and more expensive, health care. 147 Thus,
we should not be surprised to find that health care continuously grows
to consume a larger share of our economy.
Instead of asking patients whether the health care consumption is
better than nothing, we should ask patients if health consumption is
better than whatever else they may prefer. As Figure 3 shows, the po-
tential reform is simple:
1. Pay a small but substantial part of the insurance benefit as cash
directly to the patient-beneficiary.
2. If the patient chooses to proceed with the treatment, the pa-
tient takes the cash payment to the provider (along with any
required cost-share obligation), and the insurer matches it with
the balance of the insurance benefit.
Thus, the total size of the insurance benefit is unchanged.
146 See generally NvsoN, supra note 131, at 136-41 (discussing some reasons why con-
sumers do or do not purchase health insurance).
147 This problem of nonfungibility exists even for health savings accounts, which pro-
vide tax advantages for contributions and are designed to give patients skin in the game.
These accounts limit spending from the account to health-related expenses, in order to
preserve the tax advantages. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138, at 3 ("Distribu-




THE SPLIT BENEFIT MODEL
Cash Benefit
Cost Share
In-Kind Benefit (if any)
(conditional)
As such, the patient would receive both a cash benefit (the pay-
ment he or she receives) and an in-kind benefit (the payment to the
provider), while still perhaps remaining exposed to some portion of
the cost out-of-pocket. For patients that choose to spend the money
in ways other than the treatment, the insurer saves the remainder of
the cost of the procedure. For example, for each patient who would
have taken Avastin under the status quo but declines upon receiving a
$10,000 split benefit, the insurer saves $70,000. Although the size of
the insurance benefit remains unchanged, the split benefit's rerout-
ing of the flow of funds could alter patients' consumption decisions.
Such a payment gives the patient additional options for using his or
her insurance benefit, viz: an opportunity cost.
Patients who receive a split benefit may choose to proceed with
the treatment or choose to promote health in some other way, such as
consuming some other treatment not covered by the insurer (e.g., ac-
upuncture, an alternative diet regimen, a concierge doctor, or visiting
nursing services), paying money to a member of the family to stay
home and provide care to the dying patient, or purchasing disability
insurance to help cope with the symptoms of the illness. Or patients
may use the money to serve other nonmedical values, such as enhanc-
ing housing, consuming more of some luxury good, paying off other
debts that are causing disutility, paying for education (for themselves
or others), contributing to a charity, or whatever else may appeal to
the patient.
Logistically, the insurer would require the physician who recom-
mends the expensive treatment to immediately notify the insurer. In-
surers often already require physicians to submit plans for expensive
treatments to the insurer for preauthorization. The insurer would
then decide whether to pay a split benefit and, if so, deliver the split
benefit payment to the patient rather quickly (within a day or two) so
as to impact the patient's decision without causing undue delay. In-
surers should not send merely a letter that offers a payment condi-
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tional on the patient declining care. Instead, an actual payment in
advance will create a default choice and an endowment effect that
should further reduce consumption.148
The split benefit avoids the problems that traditional cost-sharing
policies stumble over. Most importantly, it solves the wealth effect-
the split benefit allows the cost-share proportion to grow with the cost
of the procedure without being financially onerous on the patient.
Other mechanisms of consumer-driven health care try to give patients
"skin in the game" by increasing patients' deductibles and then hoping
that patients will then have the wealth to compensate.' 49 Such hopes
often turn out to be false. The split benefit increases the patient's
share to a substantial portion of the cost, but only by also increasing
the patient's wealth by an equivalent amount. As a result, we can be
confident that patients will select care when it has the highest value.
Unlike a traditional cost-sharing obligation, the split benefit will not
drive patients into bankruptcy or foreclosure.
The split benefit may also be politically feasible. Unlike increased
cost sharing and rationing by insurers and physicians, the proposal
does not constrain access to care or infringe on patient choice. The
coverage and size of the insurance benefit remains unchanged. The
patient makes the ultimate decision about whether to consume.
Nonetheless, the split benefit may reduce health care spending and in
turn make broad health insurance coverage sustainable.
B. The Insurer's Option
Private insurers could begin paying split benefits immediately,
without changing their contracts. No patient could plausibly com-
plain that she received a cash benefit rather than an in-kind benefit
when her access to the given treatment remains unchanged.
Public insurance programs may require minor changes to the law
to rectify situations where the authorizing statute has unnecessarily
assumed that insurers would pay benefits to providers rather than ben-
eficiaries.150 Since the patient makes the ultimate consumption deci-
148 q RICHARD H. THALER & CAss R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DEcisIoNs ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESs 207-14 (rev. & exp. ed. 2009) (discussing another situa-
tion-waiving the right to sue for malpractice-where patients may choose reduced rights
in exchange for an economic benefit).
149 See Bloche, supra note 125, at 1319 ("Moreover, the least well-off are the least able
to contribute to HSAs, and their lower marginal tax rates makes doing so less attrac-
tive. . . . [L]owwage workers are less likely than others to receive generous employment-
based coverage, including substantial contributions toward their HSAs.").
150 The Medicare statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2006), is titled "Free choice by patient
guaranteed" and provides that "[any individual entitled to insurance benefits under this
subchapter may obtain health services from any institution, agency, or person qualified to
participate under this subchapter if such institution, agency, or person undertakes to pro-
vide him such services." Thus, the statute already contemplates that patients should be the
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sion, the split benefit does not "ration care" within the meaning of
federal law.151 Similarly, since the split benefit covers the same bene-
fits, just in a different way, the proposal does not interfere with state
or federal laws that mandate minimum coverage of certain
procedures.'5 2
This feature of the split benefit proposal-that the health care
industry can implement it immediately without a contentious political
or legal battle-is a very significant advantage of the proposal over
other ideas that may be worthwhile in theory, but stand much further
from practicability. This feature also allows the insurer to view the
split benefit as a unilateral option that it can deploy only when it is
most likely to work. Insurers will find the split benefit most useful for
procedures (whether drugs, devices, surgeries, or diagnostics) that
meet four criteria: (1) the insurer must cover the procedure, (2) the
procedure has not been proven to reduce health care expenditures
on net, (3) the price of the procedure is disproportionate compared
to the patient's wealth, and (4) the patient would otherwise be likely
to consume the treatment. Consider each in turn.
First, for procedures that physicians already refuse to prescribe or
which insurers already exclude, there is no benefit to split. 53 Alto-
gether declining coverage is cheaper than covering a procedure
through split benefit. An insurer might also use a fail-first policy to
condition coverage on patients first trying cheaper and proven treat-
ments, or getting a second opinion from an independent physician.
The split benefit presumes that there will nonetheless be a sizeable
domain of expensive treatments that remain covered by insurers.
The second criterion recognizes that a few health care expendi-
tures, such as vaccines, are actually investments, such that spending on
them will reduce future health care costs on net.15 4 A rational insurer
ones making decisions about whether and from whom to consume care. Nonetheless,
many other parts of the U.S. Code currently contemplate payments directly to hospitals,
which Congress may need to revise to allow for split benefit payments. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww ("Payments to hospitals for inpatient hospital services.").
151 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3403(a)(1),
124 Stat. 119, 490 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(c) (2)(A)(ii)) ("The propo-
sal shall not include any recommendation to ration health care, raise revenues . . . increase
Medicare beneficiary cost-sharing . . . or otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligibility
criteria.").
152 See BUNCE & WIESKE, supra note 111, at 1.
153 See supra Parts LA, .B (discussing those procedures which are already refused by
physicians and insurers in the context of "rationing" by physicians and insurers,
respectively).
154 Cf Chernew et al., supra note 25, at w201 ("Offsetting the direct costs are the sav-
ings due to the improved health generated by the extra service use. For example, the
direct costs of lower copayments for cholesterol-lowering medication would be offset, at
least partially, by savings attributable to fewer heart attacks.").
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would not utilize the split benefit where it wants to encourage, rather
than discourage, consumption.
Even with this limitation, the split benefit proposal covers a broad
swath of American health care. A 2006 study found that 21 percent of
all prescriptions written in the United States are for off-label uses and
that most of these had "little or no scientific support."155 More
broadly, "[al]though estimates vary, some experts believe that less
than half of all medical care is based on or supported by adequate
evidence about its effectiveness."' 56 Even proof of effectiveness is far
from proof that the treatment will save health care dollars on net
since many expensive treatments have quite modest benefits. Hence,
we can expect insurers to find a large domain that is ripe for the split
benefit.
Although the split benefit could be utilized for any health care
that is costly on net, individual insurers may select a narrower crite-
rion. Public insurers, in particular, may succumb to political pressure
from the providers of expensive health care treatments that would
prefer that their goods and services not be subject to even this modest
market-based scrutiny as to whether their product is worth the prices
charged. Such an insurer could respond by narrowing the program to
target drugs and devices that have unproven efficacy, especially those
prescribed "off-label." This narrower scope would neutralize any pa-
ternalistic argument on behalf of patients and would incentivize drug
manufacturers to prove the efficacy of their drugs. A narrowed do-
main for the split benefit may be better than no domain.
Insurers may, on the other hand, use the split benefit too often,
given the mobility of patients between insurers during their lifespan
and, in particular, the movement into Medicare for seniors. Since in-
surers will not themselves always reap the benefits of investments in
health care spending that only pay off in the long term, they may use
the split benefit to reduce consumption of some marginal treatments
whose benefits a future insurer would have been borne. This is one
reason that the Affordable Care Act mandated coverage of certain
preventative care services that are socially optimal even if not rational
investments for a single insurer.
Third, the split benefit will be most useful in those situations
where a patient's limited wealth makes it impractical to impose on
that patient a significant portion of the cost of a procedure. For
wealthy patients or cheap procedures, the proposal is unmotivated,
155 David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006).
156 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL
TREATMENTS, supra note 26, at 11.
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since traditional cost-sharing mechanisms are cheaper to the insurer
and may sufficiently deter overuse without reducing access.
This relationship is shown in Figure 4. The zone in which cost
sharing is now used effectively has a relatively low limit for costly treat-
ments because a patient's maximum cost share for individual proce-
dures is often a few hundred dollars, while his or her maximum
aggregate cost share over a year is a few thousand dollars.157
FIGURE 4:
OPPORTUNITY SPACE FOR SPLIT BENEFIT VERSUS COST SHARING AS A








As shown in Figure 4, a state Medicaid program that caps cover-
age eligibility at the federal poverty level may be unable to impose
cost-sharing obligations at all and thus could use the split benefit even
for inexpensive treatments.
Point B depicts the situation of the employer-sponsored health
insurer for a company like Google, which has one of the highest-paid
workforces in the world. 15 8 Although Google could impose higher
cost-sharing limits for its richer employees (making that zone triangu-
lar rather than rectangular), insurers in fact tend to impose the same
157 See Romley et al., supra note 61, at 684 (identifying the ninety-fifth percentile of the
patient cost-sharing scale at about $167 per month for the average user, as measured in
2010 dollars).





cost-sharing obligations on the richest and poorest employees alike.
This lack of sensitivity may exist because it is unseemly or impractical
to discriminate based on patient wealth. Regardless, it creates an even
larger potential for the split benefit.
Suppose that a drug that costs more than $12,000 for a course of
treatment would be a good candidate for the split benefit, since a
traditional cost-share obligation would need to be capped for median
Americans long before it covered a substantial portion of the cost.
The split benefit will still cover a huge portion of health care costs.
Recall that in 2009, 1% of the population consumed 21.8% of aggre-
gate health care costs; each individual in this 1% incurred more than
$90,000 in costs in that year. 159 Although this proposal omits all sorts
of lower-cost health care for middle income Americans-the cast on a
broken bone or the migraine medicine-this proposal targets the
rampant problem of expensive care that drives up health care costs
and insurance premiums.
The insurer also has the discretion to select what level of split is
optimal for each patient. The optimal size of the split benefit pay-
ment is an empirical question, one that is likely context-dependent.
There will presumably be diminishing marginal returns, such that
moving from a 1% to a 10% split may yield a very large reduction in
the rate of consumption, but the equally costly step of moving from a
10% split to a 19% split may yield little additional benefit.160 Patients
may view a $1,000 payment much differently than a $10,000 payment
if the first just seems like a supplement to income while the latter
creates real opportunities.' 6 '
Fourth, the rational insurer will elect to pay a split benefit pay-
ment where the patient is most likely to consume the treatment other-
wise. The insurer will decline to make a split benefit payment in cases
where it suspects that patients may be seeking, and physicians may be
providing, treatment recommendations merely for the sake of garner-
ing a cash payout.
Given that the information necessary to make such predictions
will be costly and imprecise, one can assume that split benefit pay-
ments will be made to some patients wastefully. We can roughly esti-
159 See Cohen & Yu, supra note 62, at 1.
160 See Craig R. Fox & Russell A. Poldrack, Prospect Theory and the Brain, in
NEUROECONOMICS: DECISION MNG AND THE BRAIN 145, 146 (Paul W. Glimcher et al. eds.,
2009).
161 See Claudia R. Sahm et al., Check in the Mail or More in the Paycheck: Does the Effective-
ness ofFiscal Stimulus Depend on How It Is Delivered? 4-5 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Fed.
Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2010-40, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1895524 (discussing the "mental accounting" framework of Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein, and predictions of James Suroweicki).
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mate whether over inclusiveness will be fatal to the split benefit
proposal, such that rational insurers will never exercise their option.
As shown in Table 1, there will be three types of patients whose
behaviors will be of interest to the rational insurer.162 First are the
"decliners"-those who would have received a prescription and con-
sumed under the status quo, but upon receiving the split benefit de-
cline to consume. In the foregoing Avastin example, we supposed
that selected patients might each receive a $10,000 payment toward an
$80,000 treatment. For each decliner, the insurer saves the difference
between the insurance benefit and the split-here, $70,000. Second,
the "riders" are those who receive split benefit payments but would
not have consumed the treatment under the status quo anyway. For
the riders, the split benefit is a windfall. Compared to the status quo,
the insurer loses the amount of the split-here, $10,000. Finally there
are the "seekers," who succeed in getting a prescription only for the
purpose of getting a split benefit check, which they promptly cash.
These patients also cost $10,000 each.
TABLE 1:
SCHEMATIC OF BEHAVIORS UNDER STATUS QUO AND SPLIT BENEFIT
(Assuming $80,000 Insurance Benefit and
$10,000 Split Benefit Payment)
DECLINERS RIDERS SEEKERS
STATUS QUO Prescribed? Yes Yes No
Consumed? Yes No No
SPLIT BENEFIT Prescribed? Yes Yes Yes
Consumed? No No No
Net Outcome Saves $70,000 Costs $10,000 Costs $10,000
Roughly then, we can observe that the split benefit has a relatively
high tolerance for riders and seekers, which one can group together.
Even if there are six times as many riders and seekers as there are
decliners, the split benefit is likely to save money on net.
Interestingly, the split benefit potentially saves money for the in-
surer even while providing a windfall to those innocent riders who are
genuinely sick and probably could use the money, given that illness
162 This analysis excludes the patients who will consume under either the status quo or
the split benefit, since they have no impact on cost (other than the nominal administrative
expense of paying a split benefit, if that turned out to be higher than paying the provider
in kind). In theory, there could be yet another type of patient who would have received a
prescription under the status quo, and declined to consume, but the split benefit payment
somehow caused the patient to consume the treatment.
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and injury are also associated with loss of income.163 The overinclu-
siveness of the split benefit may enhance social welfare incidentally.
Of course, the particular ratio depicted in Table 1 is peculiar to
the Avastin example and its postulated values. It may be possible that
an insurer could produce a significant number of decliners by paying
only a $5,000 split, rather than a $10,000 split. That would then
double its tolerance for riders and seekers. On the other hand, if the
split benefit is applied to other drugs that are less expensive, say
$40,000, but it is still necessary to pay $10,000 splits to get a significant
number of decliners, then the tolerance for riders and seekers will be
smaller. In that scenario, there is more of a risk that the split benefit
will lose money on net.
One form of riding and seeking behavior would arise in contexts
where there are multiple potential treatment alternatives. A patient
could seek prescriptions for several different treatments in hopes of
getting a split benefit payment, but then consume only one. Foresee-
ing this possibility, the rational insurer would pay a split benefit pay-
ment to the patient after the first such prescription, but tell the
patient that she must pay the provider if she elects to pursue any of
the courses of treatments that the insurer wishes to discourage. If
clinical studies have proved some of the potential treatments more
efficient than others, the insurer could have a tiered pricelist, just as
they currently do with cost-sharing tiers, to discourage consumption
of brand name drugs when generics are available.
In deciding whether to pay a split benefit, the insurer will analyze
its claims data to observe that some diagnoses, procedures, physicians,
and patients may have better yield rates than others. If a particular
physician very frequently prescribes treatments that appear to be cost-
ineffective but very few patients are actually electing the treatment
over the cash payment, then the ratio can be lowered or that physi-
cian's patients can be excluded from eligibility for split payments.
Clearly, the split benefit should not be paid for ailments that are
easy to fake or where the diagnosis is most subjective. For example,
nonspecific back pain may be one such diagnosis that could be oppor-
tunistic for a higher percentage of patients than other diagnoses, such
as breast cancer.1 64
In extreme cases, physicians and patients may commit outright
fraud, providing sham diagnoses in order to secure an outlay from the
163 See generally HACKER, supra note 132, at 138 ("Among insured Americans, 51 million
spend more than 10 percent of their income on medical care.").
164 Even under the status quo, there are concerns about patients faking such diagnoses
in order to procure prescriptions for narcotics. See Andrew D. Zechnich & Jerris R.
Hedges, Community-Wide Emergency Department Visits by Patients Suspected ofDrugSeekingBehav-
ior, 3 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 312 (1996). For recognition that "each illness has a different
moral hazard profile," see NMANa, supra note 131, at 154.
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insurer for a procedure that was never truly indicated, or if indicated,
not desired. These risks already exist to the extent that physicians can
bill the insurer for procedures that they do not perform or that they
perform even when not medically indicated.16 5 An agreement be-
tween patient and physician to split the cash payment would seem to
be a per se violation. Enforcement of the criminal prohibitions on
health care fraud will be part of the solution just as it is now.
The foregoing analysis suggests that there is a wide domain of
potential for rational insurers to exercise the option to pay a split ben-
efit to satisfy their coverage obligations, rather than providing an in-
kind nonfungible benefit as they currently do. Because the split bene-
fit complies with current law and contracts, it creates a unilateral op-
tion that insurers can use to reduce inefficient health care
consumption.
C. The Precedents
Research has failed to uncover a prior split benefit proposal in
the scholarly and policy literature.16 6 There are, however, various in-
teresting analogues and precedents.
In the life insurance sector, there has been a practice of people
exchanging their future life insurance benefit for a payment to be
received during life, called a "viatical." 67 In this way, the life insur-
ance benefit is made more fungible, better reflecting the consump-
tion preferences of the policyholders.
Scholars have also previously noted the problem that health in-
surance is a nonfungible benefit.168 Some have suggested an "indem-
nity" system where health insurers pay a cash benefit to patients rather
than to providers.' 69 Some automobile collision insurers likewise al-
165 See generally Joan H. Krause, Skilling and the Pursuit of Healthcare Fraud, 66 U. MIAu
L. REv. 363, 365-68 (2012) (discussing concerns about physicians committing health care
fraud).
166 John Nyman has suggested a related concept as a thought experiment. See NYMAN,
supra note 131, at 40-41 (describing "the consumer's income payoff test" as defining the
cost-effectiveness of care, predicated on the idea that the patient be given the insurance as
a fungible benefit "that she could have spent on anything else" (emphasis omitted)).
167 See VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL Act (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 2009), reprinted
in NAT'L Ass'N OF INs. Comm'Rs, 5 MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 697-1, 697-1
to -40 (2012); see alsoJessica Maria Perez, Note, You Can Bet Your Life on It! Regulating Senior
Settlements to Be a Financial Alternative for the Elderly, 10 ELDER L.J. 425, 428 (2002) (discuss-
ing the mechanics of a typical viatical settlement transaction).
168 See, e.g., Barry S. Coller, Commentary, Realigning Incentives to Achieve Health Care
Reform, 306 JAMA 204, 204 (2011) ("The current health care system does not derive the
benefit of market forces because the recipient of the services (the patient) does not di-
rectly pay the physician or hospital. Instead, a third party (the insurer) pays, and a fourth
party (the employer) often chooses the third party.").
169 See Frank D Gianfrancesco, A Proposal for Improving the Efficiency of Medical Insurance,
2 J. HEALTH ECON. 176, 176 (1983); Robert F. Graboyes, Our Money or Your Life: Indemnities
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low car owners to decide whether, when, and how to repair their car-
and, notably, to keep any balance that they decline to spend.170
In the health insurance context, a 100% cash payment of the in-
surance benefit would more dramatically correct the distortion of
nonfungible health insurance. Such a system would likely slow, or
even reverse, the growth of health spending as a portion of our econ-
omy, as people choose higher-value options. However, a pure indem-
nity would not save money for the insurer or reduce insurance
premiums for the employers and patients ex ante. Suppose that each
Avastin prescription would invoke a full payment of the $80,000 insur-
ance benefit to the patient rather than the provider. Patients would
consume less Avastin if they valued other things more, but insurers
would spend just as much money. Indeed, a pure indemnity would
likely increase net costs because it would pay benefits to riders and
seekers, who would not have consumed anyway. Even now, some pa-
tients receive prescriptions but do not consume the care, and under a
pure indemnity, more patients would seek prescriptions that they
could convert to cash. Unlike the split benefit, a pure indemnity pro-
posal has no savings to offset this risk of over inclusiveness.
Of course, a pure indemnity proposal could save money if it also
reduced the size of the insurance benefit.17' That is, however, just
another form of cost sharing, with all its problems. Instead, this Essay
proposes to split the benefit in a way that reduces costs for public and
private insurers, making health care insurance more sustainable and
less expensive for the same amount of insurance coverage. Insurance
can provide the same access to care and protection from risk at less
cost.
vs. Deductibles in Health Insurance 1-2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No.
00-04, 2000), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/
working-papers/2000/pdf/wpO-4.pdf.
170 See Susan Feigenbaum, "Body shop"Economics: What's Good for Our Cars May Be Good
for Our Health, in 15 REGULATION: CATO REv. BUs. & GoV'T 25, 27 (1992).
171 See, e.g.,Joseph P. Newhouse & Vincent Taylor, The RAND Corp., A New Approach
to Hospital Insurance 3-4 (Jan. 1969) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P4016.pdf (developing a proposal
for "Variable Cost Insurance," which sets the illness indemnity at a base level, and imposing
100% cost sharing above that level); Mark V. Pauly, Indemnity Insurance for Health Care Effi-
ciency, 24 ECON. & Bus. BULL. 53, 57 (1971) [hereinafter Pauly, Indemnity Insurance] (ex-
plaining that under such policies "[t]he insured has no protection against the contingency
that his out-of-pocket payments will be very large," and proposing a base-level indemnity
and proportional cost sharing above that level); see also Joseph P. Newhouse & Vincent
Taylor, The Subsidy Problem in Hospital Insurance A Proposal, 43 J. Bus. 452, 453-54 (1970)
(arguing that individuals would choose lower cost options if available); Mark V. Pauly, Tax-
ation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J. EcoN. LITERATURE




There are other indemnity reform proposals that bundle all po-
tential treatments for defined categories of illness, not unlike the sys-
tem Medicare now uses.172 Patients are coded into one of several
thousand "diagnosis related groups" (DRGs), each of which results in
a specified payment that represents the "average" cost of treating the
condition.173 The DRG system transfers to the hospital the risk that
within a DRG, a particular patient will get unusually expensive care; in
turn, the hospital tries to spread that risk across its patients. 74 Ac-
cordingly, the DRG system creates an incentive for hospitals to select
the easiest patients, code patients into the most lucrative DRGs, and
provide the cheapest care within those DRGs.675 Other public and
private insurers adopted this DRG payment model, and it now serves
as the norm for inpatient hospital services.' 76
Under the DRG system, insurers could make payments to pa-
tients, rather than in kind to providers. Under such a system, a pa-
tient with a given diagnosis would receive a one-time payment
representing the average amount of care for the diagnosis, and then
the patient can pay the provider on a fee-for-service basis. Insurance
would simply not cover access to care beyond the average level. Un-
like a hospital, an individual patient cannot spread the risk that she
will want or need above-average care for her disease. This system cuts
the size of the insurance benefit and thus fails to maintain access.
Alternatively, some scholars have proposed that insurers pay re-
bates to patients who select less expensive treatments and require a
payment from the patient for the more expensive treatment.177 In-
deed, some innovative programs have begun where insurers are pay-
ing small incentives to patients who choose less expensive health care
providers for the same treatments. 78 These are initial steps toward
172 See, e.g., Pauly, Indemnity Insurance, supra note 171, at 55 (proposing "[a] pure in-
demnity insurance for health-related losses ... which specified a particular dollar payment
for an individual with a given physical condition").
173 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the Medicare Prospective Payment
System: One Administrative Model for Allocating Medical Resources Under a Government Health
Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REv. 1151, 1176 (1986). Even in the prospective payment
system, hospitals can sometimes secure additional payments for "outlier" patients that re-
quire unusually expensive care. See id. at 1180. See generally RICK MAYES & ROBERT A BEREN-
SON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 70 (2006)
(discussing how hospitals turned to privately insured patients to recoup losses incurred
from Medicare patients).
174 See Paul A. Taheri et al., How DRGs Hurt Academic Health Systems, 193J. AM. C. SUR-
GEONS 1, 1 (2001).
175 See MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 173, at 72-73.
176 See Kinney, supra note 173, at 1151.
177 See Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 601-02 (suggesting the concept but not "advo-
cating for any particular insurance policy design").
178 See Michelle Andrews, Some Insurers Paying Patients Who Agree to Get Cheaper Care,
KAISER HEALTH NEws (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/
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the fundamental reconceptualization of the insurance benefit pro-
posed herein.
The closest analogue to the split benefit proposal is a German
disability insurance program limited to those needing home care.179
The German program offers patients an option to receive an in-kind
benefit consisting of health care workers visiting their homes or a
smaller cash payment instead.180 Unlike the split benefit, the German
program's cash payments are not designed to give the patient skin in
the game when deciding whether to consume the in-kind services. In-
stead, the cash payment is the complete alternative benefit, one that a
patient can use to support home care that he or she arranges, perhaps
through family or informal support relationships."s The German pa-
tients elect which sort of benefit to receive; there does not appear to
be a default rule. 182 The German program suggests that the split ben-
efit payments might lead to a significant reduction in consumption.
Based on data from the 1990s, "more than 75% of home care benefi-
ciaries chose cash rather than services." 83
III
PRAcTICiAL AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
This Part explores challenges to the split benefit concept, includ-
ing both a practical challenge by the providers of expensive treat-
ments, and normative challenges-some paternalistic and some
teleological.' 8 4 Ultimately, the split benefit arguably improves patient
autonomy and welfare. But even if the split benefit were neutral on




179 See Joshua M. Wiener & Alison Evans Cuellar, Public and Private Responsibilities:
Home- and Community-Based Services in the United Kingdom and Germany, 11 J. AGING &
HEALTH 417, 437-38 (1999). In another German program, patients receive insurance pre-
mium rebates if they receive no care for a given period. See Peter Zweifel, Premium Rebates
for No Claims: The West German Experience, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE POuTICAL ECON-
OMY OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH INSURANCE 323, 324 (H.E. Frech III ed., 1988).
180 See Wiener & Cuellar, supra note 179, at 437-38 ("For those in the most disabled
category-needing activities of daily living care during the day and night-the cash level is
$750 per month, as opposed to $1,400 in services.").
181 Id. at 439.
182 See id. at 437 ("For home care, the new insurance plan offers a choice: services, cash
equivalent to about half the cost of services, or a combination of the two.").
183 Id. at 438.
184 I explored other practical challenges, including fraud and over inclusiveness, when
I specified the criteria for paying a split benefit. See supra Part II.B.
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THE SPLIT BENEFIT
A. Co-optation by Producers
Those who stand to benefit from spending on expensive treat-
ments (the producers and providers of these drugs, devices, and pro-
cedures) may attempt to co-opt the split benefit by making side
payments. For example, suppose a patient receives a physician's rec-
ommendation for Avastin and a $10,000 split benefit payment from
the insurer. The drug manufacturer, the oncologist, or both could
then send the patient a $10,000 coupon, telling the patient that he or
she can take that, rather than the $10,000 cash, to the oncologist to
initiate treatment. The split benefit proposal would thus fail to re-
duce consumption.
This objection is not peculiar to the split benefit; drug manufac-
turers already use such coupon strategies to defeat traditional cost-
sharing strategies, at great cost to insurers.a 5 For patients covered by
federal health insurance programs and for all patients in Massachu-
setts, such kickbacks are illegal.186 Congress could, and likely should,
expand these prohibitions through state or federal legislation.
Insurers can also use their insurance contracts with patients to
prohibit the use of coupons and can condition payments to providers
on assurance that the provider did not accept a coupon. Finally, it
would appear that insurers could use the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to litigate against those who pay cou-
pons, since federal law -elsewhere defines these as kickbacks.1 87
B. Access and Autonomy
If a physician refuses to write a prescription because of cost, if an
insurer refuses to cover such a prescription, or if an onerous cost
share exceeds a patient's ability to pay-the health care system has
denied the patient the choice. In contrast, the split benefit keeps the
decision in the hands of the patient.
As Bill Sage explains, "nearly all progressive impulses among
American health lawyers and policy makers over the past half century
have sought to liberate and empower the patient. Phrases used to ex-
press this desire include 'patient autonomy,' 'patients' rights,' 'patient
185 SeeJonathan D. Rockoff, Drug Makers Criticized for Co-Pay Subsidies, WALL ST. J., July
20, 2009, at BI; Chanajoffe-Walt, Drug Coupons Hide True Costs from Consumers, NPR (Oct.
20, 2009, 1:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?stoyld=113969968.
186 See Visante, How COPAY CoUPoNs COULD RAISE PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS BY $32
BILLION OVER THE NEXT DECADE 3 (2011), available at http://www.masspirg.org/uploads/
bf/95/bf95f22db81052a7acb378a366b73a6c/visante-copay-coupon-study.pdf.
187 See Krause, supra note 165, at 363-64, 388-89; Linda A. Johnson, Consumer Group





self-determination,' [and] 'patient preferences."'18 8 The autonomy
agenda has, however, been cramped because insurance views the pa-
tient as merely a patient. He or she gets a walled garden of medical
choices. The split benefit instead embraces a value pluralism, respect-
ing the patient's weighing of medical and nonmedical values.
One might object that the split benefit payment seems coercive
or bribe-like, perhaps an "undue influence."189 The worry is that the
split benefit payment will unduly push patients away from consuming
health care. To the contrary, the entire insurance relationship on net,
even including a split benefit payment, still induces patients toward
consuming health care. The insurer tells the patient that he or she
can spend the money on anything, but if the patient wants to consume
health care, then the insurer will provide a nine-times subsidy (assum-
ing a ten percent split). Merely allowing the patient to decide how
she wants to spend one-tenth of her insurance benefit does not consti-
tute an "undue influence."' 9
Still, the additional options created by the split benefit may cause
subjective disutility to the patient tasked with deciding.' 9 ' Prior be-
havioral research documents that, when given more options, people
are sometimes less satisfied.192 On the other hand, there is heteroge-
neity-some enjoy tasks that require effortful thinking and may savor
the opportunities created by the new wealth.' 93
188 Sage, supra note 66, at 1505 (footnotes omitted). Still, Sage worries that "the pa-
tient's conquest" will run up costs so much that it "risk[s] the collapse of the health care
system that he or she would dominate." Id. at 1508.
189 Critics have raised a similar concern with regard to payments made to human sub-
jects as compensation for their participation in research. See generally Ari VanderWalde &
Seth Kurzban, Paying Human Subjects in Research: Where Are We, How Did We Get Here, and
Now What?, 39J.L. MED. & ETHics 543, 544 (2011) (reviewing the literature surrounding
these objections). There are good reasons to doubt this entire line of critique. SeeJohn
Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 631, 662 (1994) ("An offer of benefits can
never be coercive ......").
190 See Christopher Tarver Robertson, From Free Riders to Fairness: A Cooperative System for
Organ Transplantation, 48JURIMETRICS 1, 36-38 (2007) (arguing against the idea that auton-
omy somehow entails a right to ignore the consequences of one's decisions).
191 Cf Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 602 (discussing the concern of "whether being
confronted with financial considerations lowers utility beyond the inherent disutility associ-
ated with paying"); Wendy Levinson et al., Not All Patients Want to Participate in Decision
Making: A National Study of Public Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531, 531 (2005)
("[H]alf of the respondents (52%) preferred to leave final decisions to their physi-
cians . . . ."). But see Lesley F. Degner & Catherine Aquino Russell, Preferences for Treatment
Control AmongAdults with Cancer, 11 REs. NURSING & HEALTH 367, 372 (1988) (pointing out
that most patients preferred to share decision-making control with their doctor).
192 See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LEss (2004)
(using contemporary psychological studies to argue that eliminating choices may reduce
consumer anxiety).
193 There is robust psychological literature on this point. See, e.g.,John T. Cacioppo &




Perhaps some prefer the luxury of deciding under conditions of
moral hazard, which the split benefit undermines. In principle, those
people could pay extra for health insurance policies that reduced
their range of choices by keeping benefits nonfungible. If there is
market and political demand for that service, the health care industry
can provide it.
Still, there may be situations where the patient cannot decide
whether to consume a treatment and where someone else, such as a
parent or next of kin, decides on the patient's behalf. The split bene-
fit proposal may create a conflict of interest if that substituted decision
maker receives the benefit of the cash payment (either through ex-
propriation or inheritance), while the patient receives any benefit of
the treatment. 19 4 It may be best to limit the split benefit program to
only those situations where the patient is competent to make treat-
ment decisions. Still, traditional cost-sharing obligations already im-
pose these sorts of dilemmas on substituted decision makers who
would rather keep the money. Even worse, traditional cost-sharing ob-
ligations, unlike the split benefit, may be so onerous that they deny
access to the expensive care altogether.
C. Welfare and Health Exceptionalism
Ezekiel Emanuel put the proposition simply: "The more we
spend on health care, the less we can spend on other things we
value."195 By simply making a cash transfer, the split benefit facilitates
our trades to higher value and thereby makes us better off.
Some patients have preferences for aggressive care, which the
split benefit and the status quo equally satisfy. The split benefit pay-
ment also satisfies other patient preferences.'9 6 The split benefit pro-
vides a way "to reduce spending while improving the quality of end-of-
life care by ensuring that patient preferences are followed more
closely."1 9 7
194 A similar problem arises in the social security context. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PUB.
No. 05-10076, A GUIDE FOR REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES 6 (2009), available at http://ssa.gov/
pubs/10076.html (describing restrictions on the use of benefits by "representative pay-
ees"). See generally Kurt C. Kleinschmidt, Elder Abuse: A Review, 30 ANNALS EMERGING MED.
463, 464 (1997) (describing financial abuse through the improper use of government ben-
efits as a modern form of elder abuse). Public and private insurers should be required to
disclose such payments, just as banks and individuals are currently required to disclose the
receipt of cash payments of over $10,000. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2006) (placing a disclosure
mandate on banks); 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (2006) (placing a similar mandate on individuals).
195 Emanuel, supra note 5.
196 See Pauly, Indemnity Insurance, supra note 171, at 53 ("The market, in its own way,
provides information about individual preferences. When people decide to buy or not to
buy, or to offer for sale or not offer for sale, they indicate what things are worth to them.").
197 GOODMAN ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH PoucY & CLINICAL PRACTICE,
TRENDS AND VARIATION IN END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH SEVERE
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Still, medical literacy will remain a problem. We know, for exam-
ple, that most patients undergoing chemotherapy overestimate its po-
tential benefits, supposing that it is curative when it is not.'98 Even
with a split benefit, patients will continue to make bad choices-some-
times consuming a drug or device that they would be better off declin-
ing and sometimes declining a drug or device that they would be
better off consuming. The split benefit may change the relative shares
of these two types of errors.199 Regardless of the split benefit, physi-
cians, insurers, and policymakers should create a "choice architec-
ture," consisting of second opinions, counseling services, and
consumer information to assist patients with the decision-making
process. 200
More particularly, one might worry that the particular form of
the split benefit payment-a $10,000 check-may bias patients away
from treatments with benefits that are likely to accrue more gradu-
ally.2 0 Policymakers could require that splits be paid as annuities with
payments spread over the same period of benefit that would be pro-
vided by treatment. It bears emphasis, however, that the rational in-
surer will pay splits that are small relative to the total cost of the
procedure, which allows patients to irrationally double or even quin-
tuple the subjective value of the cash while still erring on the side of
the treatment.
The poorest patients also present a particular concern. The poor
patient's alternative consumption choices for food or housing are
more pressing than those of the median patient. This makes the poor
patient more likely to decline care in order to pursue those alterna-
tives. Insurers could scale split benefit payments according to patient
wealth, but that may appear unfair. With same-size splits, the benefits
of a fungible payment will be greatest for the poor, precisely because
those alternative consumption options-such as food or housing-
CHRONIC ILLNEss 2 (Bronner ed., 2011) [hereinafter DARTMOUTH INsr.], available at http:/
/www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/EOL.Trend_Reportl0411.pdf.
198 See Jane C. Weeks et al., Patients'Expectations About Effects of Chemotherapy for Advanced
Cancer, 367 N. ENG. J. MED 1616, 1620 (2012).
199 For an example of such a criticism of consumer directed health care generally, see
Bloche, supra note 125, at 1320 ("The consumer-directed model pushes back against this
quality improvement strategy by calling on patients to plan their own care. Its cost-sharing
requirements discourage patients from compliance with coordinated care based on best
practices.").
200 See Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 603 ("Frequently, patients are provided with
literature that describes treatment options. More recently, researchers have begun to pro-
duce sophisticated decision assistance tools in media such as interactive video to facilitate
patient input into the decision-making process."). See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 148, at 81 (discussing choice architecture).
201 See generally George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER




will actually be better for the poor patient than expensive health care.
Even if we focused exclusively on health outcomes, evidence suggests
that investments in housing, diet, and education may prove more ef-
fective than investments in expensive medical interventions. 202 If the
choice is hard, it is because the alternatives are attractive.
It would be difficult to motivate a broader paternalistic critique of
the split benefit based on a worry about patients foregoing needed
treatments. First, even if one allows the paternalist to ignore cost, the
paternalist lacks proof of efficacy for many of these expensive treat-
ments or proof of improved efficacy over the standard of care. As
such, the paternalist cannot say that the drug or device is on net more
helpful to the patient.203 Even for those treatments that are proven to
be more effective, given a pluralism about ultimate values, it may not
be irrational for a patient to prefer a treatment plan that is less inva-
sive and less expensive.204 There is already wide heterogeneity in deci-
sions about how to treat and cope with severe illness, and the split
benefit will just move the median patient marginally across that
spectrum.205
More fundamentally, this sort of paternalistic objection, if mer-
ited, would undermine traditional cost-sharing policies, which utilize
the same opportunity cost mechanism but are stymied by the wealth
effects discussed above. Implicitly, the paternalist would have to main-
tain that all health care decisions, or perhaps all consumption deci-
sions, be made under conditions of absolute moral hazard. Such a
theory ignores scarcity and the practical need for someone to weigh
the benefits against the costs.2 06
A related objection would invoke the specialness of health. One
might argue, as Amartya Sen has, that "health is among the most im-
202 See Clare Bambra et al., Tackling the Wider Social Determinants of Health and Health
Inequalities: Evidence from Systematic Reviews, 64J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 284,
285-89 (2010).
203 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
204 See Ken Murray, How Doctors Die: It's Not Like the Rest of Us, But It Should Be, Z6cALo
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://zocalopublicsquare.org/thepublicsquare/2011/11/30/how-
doctors-die/read/nexus/ ("Hospice care, which focuses on providing terminally ill pa-
tients with comfort and dignity rather than on futile cures, provides most people with
much better final days. Amazingly, studies have found that people placed in hospice care
often live longer than people with the same disease who are seeking active cures.").
205 See generally DARTMOUTH INST., supra note 197, at 1-3 (finding that changes in end-
of-life treatment for Medicare beneficiaries with severe chronic illnesses between 2000 and
2007 varied significantly between regions and hospitals).
206 For a discussion of the move toward a population-based bioethics, see Dan W.
Brock, Considerations of Equity in Relation to Prioritization and Allocation of Health Care Re-
sources, in ETHics, EQUITY AND THE RENEWAL OF WHO's HEALTH-FOR-ALL STRATEGY 60, 60
(Z. Bankowski,J.H. Bryant &J. Gallagher eds., 1997) (arguing for an analysis of equity and
utility that incorporates "the full ethical complexity of achieving equity in the prioritization
and distribution of health-care resources").
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portant conditions of human life and a critically significant constitu-
ent of human capabilities which we have reason to value."207 Thus, it
may seem perverse for the split benefit policy to facilitate patients
trading health care in favor of other goods, such as housing or even
jewelry. As a scholar in a related context has said, "the money is given
for certain purposes and not others, and it would be considered an
abuse to use it for something else, even if that were preferred." 208
This critique does not bear scrutiny. People buy insurance to en-
sure future access to care that they otherwise could not afford.209 Ex
ante, consumers need not know whether they will actually want to con-
sume a given drug for a given disease that they may someday suffer.
But rational consumers want the option to consume such drugs when
they become better informed by their actual experience of the situa-
tion.210 Ex post, having secured the option, a rational consumer may
nonetheless prefer to spend that benefit on other things.21' The split
benefit is perfectly congruent with the option-buying purpose of in-
surance. It has the side benefits of increasing patient wealth and re-
ducing insurance costs along the way.
As Sen himself recognizes, "[w]hat is particularly serious as an
injustice is the lack of opportunity that some may have to achieve good
health because of inadequate social arrangements, as opposed to, say,
a personal decision not to worry about health in particular."212 Like-
wise, courts and commentators have recognized that Congress created
Medicare "to insure that adequate medical care is available to the aged
throughout this country."213 Even if the purpose of health insurance
were much narrower, it is not necessarily true that the means to that
207 Amartya Sen, Why Health Equity?, 11 HEALTH EcON. 659, 660 (2002); see also Nor-
man Daniels, justice, Health, and Healthcare, 1 Am. J. BIOETHICS 2, 3 (2001) (arguing that
health care allows people to fully participate in all spheres of their social lives).
208 Jonathan Wolff, Cognitive Disability in a Society ofEquals, in COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND
ITs CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 147, 150 (Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds.,
2010); see also Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 185, 243 (1981) (developing the thought experiment of a paraplegic violinist who
prefers a violin over health care).
209 See generally NYMAN, supra note 131, at 2 (describing the purchase of health care as a
transfer of income); Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Frag-
mented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM.J.L. & MED. 7,11 (2010) (developing the concept
of "health redistribution").
210 See Romley et al., supra note 61, at 683.
211 SeeJost, supra note 2, at 582 (discussing such changes in perspective).
212 Sen, supra note 207, at 660 (emphasis added).
213 Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1281 (3d Cir. 1974) (emphasis added); see
alsoJames M. Peterson, Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis: Are Medicare Beneficiaries




end must be so narrowly circumscribed. 2 1 4 If the split benefit reduces
health insurance costs, it may facilitate broader, more robust, and
more sustainable health coverage over the long run.
CONCLUSIONS
The split benefit is a way to reduce the cost of health insurance,
or could be a way to increase access and coverage at the same cost.
We can save money without impinging on the advisory role of physi-
cians, the autonomous choices of patients, or patients' access to care.
In some instances, we should replace onerous traditional cost-sharing
obligations with split benefit payments, which are instead painless for
patients. In other instances, we should supplement traditional cost
sharing with split benefit payments, which will increase the opportu-
nity cost-signal beyond the level of traditional cost sharing.
The split benefit presents an opportunity to improve the effi-
ciency of the larger economy. As Bill Sage has argued, "we seem fi-
nally to have reached the point at which spending more on health
care means denying our other material needs. Stagnant wages for
many middle-class Americans, for example, may in part reflect the ris-
ing cost of employer-sponsored health coverage crowding out cash
raises in workplaces."2 15 The split benefit reduces that distortion and
returns some of the wages to the workers. It does so ex ante, by reduc-
ing insurance premiums for the same coverage, and ex post, by al-
lowing people to choose for themselves how they wish to spend some
of their insurance benefits.
214 See Betsey A. Kuhn et al., Policy Watch: The Food Stamp Program and Welfare Reform, 10
J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 192 ("While all of the food stamps are spent on food, funds previously
spent on food are reallocated to other needs, such as rent, clothing or medical care.").
215 Sage, supra note 66, at 103 (footnote omitted); see also Baicker & Chandra, supra
note 20, at 17 (discussing evidence "suggesting that we may be spending too much on
health relative to other goods."); Emanuel, supra note 5 ("Over the past 30 years, health
care inflation has been a major reason average wages have remained stagnant.").
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